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Networking responses to different levels of institutional void: 
A comparison of internationalizing SMEs in Egypt and the UK 
 
ABSTRACT 
  
This paper reports a comparative qualitative study of how decision-makers in 
internationalizing SMEs respond to relevant institutions in their domestic environment 
through networking activity. Twenty SMEs are compared respectively from a developing 
economy (Egypt) and a developed economy (UK). The two countries contrast both in the 
effectiveness of their institutional support for SMEs and in their cultural norms towards 
network relationships. Substantial differences are found between the two national samples in 
SME decision makers’ networking behaviour in response to specific institutional conditions. 
The links between institutional conditions, national cultural norms and SME networking 
responses are explicated in a new theoretical model. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although it is recognized that there are interdependencies between institutions and networks, 
the links between them remain under theorized (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008). One link is 
manifest in the non-market strategies of firms by which they endeavour to secure the support 
of institutions, and even shape their policies, through networking processes such as lobbying, 
co-optation and relationship management (Mellahi, Frynas, Sun & Siegel, 2016). However, 
the examples studied have focused on large firms that have the resources and influence to 
engage the attention of institutional bodies and their officials (e.g. Frynas, Pigman & Mellahi, 
2006; Hadjikhani, Elg & Ghauri, 2012; Child, Tse & Rodrigues, 2013). Smaller firms are 
likely to experience much greater power asymmetry vis-à-vis institutions and may therefore 
need to depend more heavily on the help of intermediaries, particularly in contexts where 
their rights to institutional access and support are limited (Child & Rodrigues, 2011).  
 
Smaller firms tend to rely on external parties in order to secure information, resources and 
other support for strategic initiatives such as entering new foreign markets (Harris, Rae & 
Misner, 2012). The significance in this respect of institutions for internationalizing small 
firms has come to be recognized in recent years (Cheng & Yu, 2008). Government 
institutions promoting SME business development and foreign trade can offer critical 
assistance in furthering such initiatives (Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2006; Descotes, Walliser, 
Holzmuller & Guo, 2011; Makhmadshoev, Ibeh & Crone, 2015; Oparaocha, 2015).  While 
there is a general need for more comparative investigation of how domestic institutional 
conditions affect the internationalization of firms (He & Cui, 2012), this applies particularly 
to the case of SMEs.  Comparative research on the relation of institutions to SMEs, and on 
how SMEs respond to institutional conditions, promises to provide a fruitful basis for further 
theorizing.   
 
Comparisons across countries suggest that their institutions can affect small firms in different 
ways and to varying degrees (Ciravegna, Lopez & Kundu, 2014; Kiss and Danis, 2010).  In 
some countries they offer them financial and informational resources, while in others they 
provide little such support and even erect barriers in the way of business initiatives (Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor 2014; World Bank, 2015). This distinction is reflected in two 
perspectives: the institutional support perspective and the institutional void perspective 
(Stephan, Uhlander & Stride, 2015). The institutional support perspective assumes that 
 
 
governments and their agencies can effectively promote small business entrepreneurship 
through providing necessary resources, especially when these are made accessible under the 
terms of clear universalistic rules. The institutional void perspective by contrast implies that 
not only can there be a lack of institutional support for entrepreneurship, but that inadequate 
institutional rules and their weak enforcement can generate uncertainty, inhibit participation 
in markets and limit growth (Mair & Marti, 2009; Khanna & Palepu, 2010). Institutional 
voids often manifest as ‘gaps between formal rules and norms, and their enforcement in daily 
practice’ (Rodrigues, 2013, p. 14).  
 
SMEs seeking to internationalize may depend on domestic institutions to provide financial 
assistance and/or market information, or for securing relevant business licenses. The 
literature has to date generally focused on the institutional context as a given external factor 
and hardly examined the use by SMEs of initiatives to overcome deficiencies inherent in that 
external context (Tracey & Phillips, 2011). Also, there has been relatively little research on 
how SMEs try to cope with specific institutional voids, especially in developing countries 
(Bruton, Ahlstrom & Obloj, 2008). Coping behaviour includes ways in which SMEs may 
seek to adapt to, or compensate for, institutional voids by seeking support through 
networking (Ellis, 2011; Musteen, Datta & Butts, 2014; Su, Xie & Wang, 2015).  
 
The primary aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical model of networking by 
internationalizing SMEs in the light of domestic institutional conditions and cultures. The 
model is informed both by extant literature and by an exploratory empirical investigation that 
compares SMEs located in a developing country context (Egypt) and a developed one (UK).  
These two countries contrast in their general level of institutional development and 
specifically with regarding agencies officially promoting SME internationalization. Two 
forms of institutional void among such agencies will be apparent, especially in Egypt.  These 
respectively concern the quality of formal support schemes and the ease of access to them.  
We adopt an agentic view of the relations between SMEs and domestic institutions. In 
institutional theory, this view maintains that while institutions establish certain conditions for 
organizations, decision-makers in those organizations have the ability to adapt purposively to 
such conditions (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008).  The accounts and interpretations of SME 
decision-makers themselves are therefore used as sources which offer insights into how their 
networking is both a response to institutional voids and is also culturally-influenced.  It is 
important to stress that the empirical evidence offered by the paper is exploratory and 
 
 
qualitative, and intended to inform a process of theory development rather than to be used for 
theory-testing. Its concentration on SMEs promises to provide a well-defined ground for the 
study of how institutional characteristics relate to firm behaviour.  As already noted, a 
common attribute of SMEs is that they are likely to be dependent on, or at least highly 
welcoming of, institutional support. Secondly, the focus on internationalization serves to 
identify a specific set of public institutions that have the formal mission of promoting 
exporting.   
 
In addition to advancing a theoretical framework, the paper adds to knowledge in other more 
specific ways. It elaborates the concept of institutional void by taking account of deficiencies 
both in terms of technical inadequacies and of dysfunctional social behaviour.  It shows that 
this distinction is significant for understanding the responses of SME entrepreneurs as 
institutional clients.  Second, it reports one of the few studies to demonstrate that the 
networking of small business entrepreneurs is influenced by their experiences of the 
institutions established to assist their international business objectives.  This extends our 
understanding of SME networking behaviour. Third, its empirical investigation includes 
Egypt which is a relatively under-researched economy in the international business and 
entrepreneurship literature. Fourth, the paper illustrates that differences in national 
development and cultures are associated with contrasts in institutional behaviour as well as in 
the responses of SME decision-makers.  This illuminates the need to incorporate both cultural 
and economic perspectives in international business research as well as multiple (country 
context and firm) levels of analysis.  
 
The following section draws from the literature and documented sources to identify the 
relevance of domestic institutions for internationalizing SMEs and how they contrast between 
Egypt and the UK.  The question of culturally-informed networking responses to institutional 
conditions is then considered. This is followed by an explanation of the methodology of the 
empirical investigation.  While the national comparisons rely on secondary data, evidence on 
networking by SME decision-makers and how they account for it, draws upon primary data 
provided by the actors themselves.  The discussion analyses the findings leading to the 
development of a theoretical model. We conclude with implications, limitations and lines of 
further research. 
 
 
 
 
INSTITUTIONS AND SMEs 
Significance of institutions for SMEs 
SMEs seeking to engage in international business can benefit from domestic institutional 
resource-provision in terms of furnishing information on foreign markets and the conditions 
for doing business in them, as well as providing financial support for participating in trade 
missions, for making contacts in foreign markets, and for underwriting payment risks 
(Francis & Collins-Dodd, 2004; Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2006). Information on foreign 
markets and financial aid for new market entry are among the most significant of such 
resources to support foreign transactions (Liesch & Knight, 1999; 
Brouthers, Nakos, Hadjimarcou & Brouthers, 2009). Unless SMEs can secure alternative 
sources of these resources, through for example forming partnerships with MNEs (Das, 
2015), they are liable to be dependent on institutions for key resources assisting their 
internationalization. Additionally, in some countries institutional approval is required for 
firms to engage in certain categories of foreign business. This means that they have a critical 
resource dependency on particular institutions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Casciaro & 
Piskorski, 2005).  Certification by international standards authorities can also assist 
exporting, especially by developing economy firms (Goedhuys & Sleuwaegen, 2016). If 
institutional support is deficient in quality, or is withheld, SMEs seeking to export may be 
disadvantaged. Furthermore, institutions may act dysfunctionally for internationalizing SMEs 
by, for instance, operating corruptly or imposing restrictions on access to their services.  
Voids in this institutional sector can therefore arise from two factors: institutions’ technical 
inadequacies and the imposition of negative informal conditions on their support. 
 
The extent of such voids is expected to vary as between developed and developing 
economies. A relationship between levels of institutional and economic development has 
been noted for some time (Acemoglu, 2010; Chang, 2011; Castellacci, 2015).  SMEs located 
in developing economies tend to suffer from relatively weak institutional contexts, in which 
the enactment of laws and regulations is inefficient, corruption and bureaucracy tend to be 
prevalent, and supporting educational systems and infrastructures are limited (Mesquita & 
Lazzarini, 2008).  The institutional environment of less-developed countries is likely to be 
problematic for firms, because its immaturity creates uncertainty and adds to transaction costs 
(Farashahi & Hafsi, 2009; Chrysostome & Molz, 2014; Silvestre, 2015).  Even emerging 
 
 
economies, so-called because they combine high rates of growth with moves to reform their 
market and other institutions (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & Wright, 2000), offer lower levels of 
institutional support to firms than is typical of developed economies, and have business 
environments that are less stabilized by universalistic rules (Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008; 
Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik & Peng, 2009).   
 
The contrast between developed and developing economies suggests that the former are 
characterized to a greater degree by ‘hard institutions’, whereas in the latter ‘soft institutions’ 
are more salient. Hard institutions are manifest in legal and other formal rules, akin to what 
have been called ‘formal’ institutions. By contrast, soft institutions manifest themselves in 
social and cultural norms, and traditional customary practices – akin to so-called ‘informal’ 
institutions (North, 1990; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). Soft 
institutions are culturally informed and may serve up to a point to compensate for gaps in, or 
failure to apply, hard institutional provisions (Tully, 1995; Xin & Pearce, 1996; Wiener, 
2006).  
 
A comparison between Egypt and the UK serves to illustrate the developing/developed 
economy contrast in institutional provisions to facilitate SME internationalization.  
According to the World Bank (2013) country classification, Egypt is a low-middle income 
developing economy, while the UK is a high income developed economy. A FTSE report in 
2010 classified Egypt as a secondary emerging economy, and the UK as a developed 
economy.  Egypt’s per capital income in 2010 was US$ 2,804 while that of the UK was US$ 
36,573 (World Bank, 2014). There is a clear contrast in the two countries’ levels of 
development, and this is accompanied by a parallel contrast in the extent to which they 
exhibit institutional voids.1  
 
The indicators set out in Table 1 consistently show Egypt having significantly more 
institutional voids relevant to business than the UK.  The first two indicators adopt the criteria 
of institutional voids suggested by Rodrigues (2013), namely the extent of open government 
and regulatory enforcement. Scores from the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index 
(Agrast, Botero, Martinez, Ponce & Pratt, 2013), indicate that Egypt was considerably lower 
on both criteria than the UK.  Egypt also scored much lower for absence of corruption 
                                                 
1 Where possible data refer to 2010, the year immediately preceding the 2011 revolution in Egypt, which 
matches the timing of the first round of our data collection.  
 
 
according to Transparency International’s comparative index. Data from the World Economic 
Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey rated Egypt as a consistently less favourable business 
environment than the UK regarding diversion of public funds, irregular payments and bribes, 
favouritism in decisions of government officials, and transparency of government 
policymaking. Finally, Egypt scored low on the presence of government programmes at 
national and regional level to support new and growing firms. Coping with government 
bureaucracy and regulations are obstacles facing SMEs in Egypt, while difficulties are also 
reported with obtaining permits and licences. In 2010 Egypt occupied the 41st rank in terms 
of the efficiency of government support programmes compared to the 20th rank occupied by 
the UK (GEM, 2010). After the recent revolution, Egypt was ranked 52nd in terms of the 
efficiency of government support and relevance compared to the 19th rank held by the UK 
(GEM, 2015).  Overall, Egypt has had a greater incidence of institutional voids both in terms 
of technical competence and in terms of negative informal practices. 
 
Table 1.  Contrasts in Institutional Voids between Egypt and the UK 
 
Indicator and source Egypt UK 
Open government 2 
World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index 
(Agrast et al., 2013) 
 
0.48 
 
0.78 
Regulatory enforcement 2 (Agrast et al., 2013) 
 
0.42 0.79 
International Corruption Index 2010: Score for absence of 
corruption (range 10 to 0) among 178 countries 
(Transparency International 2010, 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results#CountryResults) 
 
 
3.1 
 
7.6 
World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2011. 
(World Economc Forum 2011, Global Competitiveness 
Report 2011-2012 Indicators derived from the Executive 
Opinion Survey are expressed as scores on a 1–7 scale, with 7 
being the most desirable outcome: 
Diversion of public funds 
Irregular payments and bribes 
Favouritism in decisions of government officials 
Transparency of government policymaking 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8 
3.8 
2.6 
3.8 
 
 
 
 
 
5.7 
5.9 
4.3 
5.2 
The contribution of government programmes to 
entrepreneurship support: rank out of 53 countries 2010. From 
National Experts Survey (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 
2010).   
 
 
41st 
 
20th 
 
                                                 
2 Data are for 2012. Earlier information was not available for Egypt.  The index is constructed so that 
1=the highest possible score and 0=the lowest. ‘Open government’ is assessed by three indicators 
reflecting whether laws are publicised, stable and accessible.  ‘Regulatory enforcement’ is assessed by 
three indicators indicating whether regulations are enforced effectively, without improper influence and 
unreasonable delay. 
 
 
  
 
 
In Egypt there were three government agencies that officially offered support for SME 
internationalization (GEM, 2010). The Social Fund for Development [SFD] had helped 
SMEs in the late 1990s, when it offered loans to firms with simple requirements, sponsored 
them to attend foreign and domestic trade fairs and even provided incubator services for 
software companies. However, the SFD management changed and began to impose 
conditions that made it difficult for companies to obtained loans.  It also became a legal 
requirement that if an SME were to get support from the SFD, it had to apply for a loan first.   
After the revolution, the Egyptian economy depended to a great extent on foreign aid, 
subsidies and loans from the European Bank, World Bank and grants from rich Arabic 
countries. Those grants especially from the World Bank and European Bank focused mainly 
on offering support to SMEs in the form of services rather than loans and they also met the 
salaries of the SFD staff.  The other two agencies were the Industrial Marketing Centre [IMC] 
and Expo-link. The IMC and Expo-link differed from the SFD in that they were sponsored by 
foreign aid sources such as the EU and Japan. However, the majority of their managers were 
Egyptian, with a few foreign donor representatives. They targeted certain sectors and 
industries, and offered financial assistance towards the cost of international certifications, 
foreign trade fairs, and the like. In principle, Egyptian embassies abroad could also assist 
internationalizing SMEs, but none of those studied reported that they had received any help 
from this source. 
 
In the UK, UK Trade and Investment [UKTI]3 was the government funded agency with the 
mission to promote foreign trade and inward investment. It supported various schemes which 
were typically run by local chambers of commerce (UKTI, 2011). The UKTI also had 
responsibility for commercial staff in UK embassies abroad who often provided considerable 
assistance to SMEs seeking to enter the local foreign market. The UKTI provided SMEs with 
access to information, advice from international trade advisors and other staff based both in 
the UK and in foreign consulates and embassies, help in identifying business leads in foreign 
markets, sources of funding available for SMEs to participate in trade fairs, and other 
financial assistance programmes.  UKTI advice was mainly directed at new exporters but 
some was also given to established and experienced exporters. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Since July 2016, UKTI has been replaced by Department for International Trade [DIT]. 
 
 
Networking, institutional contexts and cultural effects 
The presence of institutional voids can lead to the marginalization, even exclusion, of 
relatively powerless actors such as SMEs (Mair, Martí & Ventresca, 2012). Small firms are 
likely to have to rely on the mediation of local partners and other network contacts to cope 
with this situation (Child & Rodrigues, 2011). Networking is expected to be particularly 
critical for smaller firms in developing economies that have high external dependency on 
problematic institutions (Senik, Scott-Ladd & Entrekin, 2011).   The network perspective has 
come to be emphasized in analyses of the internationalization process.  Johanson & Vahlne 
(2009) argue that ‘insidership’ in relevant networks is a prerequisite for successful 
internationalization. In view of their vulnerabilities and/or newness, networking benefits are 
likely to be especially significant to internationalizing SMEs (Bell, Crick & Young, 2004; 
Wincent, 2005; Coviello, 2006). 
 
There is evidence suggesting that when institutional voids are present in a country, forms of 
networking and other adaptive behaviour are more likely to reflect national cultural norms 
(Chakrabarty, 2009). In developing countries with immature formal institutions, SMEs need 
to rely on strong particularistic ties to facilitate their internationalization (Kiss & Danis, 
2008).  Many developing economies are characterized by collectivist and particularistic 
cultures in which strong cohesive relationships are valued and favoured (Hofstede, 2001; 
Nardon & Steers, 2009).  These strong ties are characterised by a high frequency of social 
interaction, and are sources of resources that help SME leaders to solve problems 
(Granovetter, 1973; Woolcock, 1998; Hansen, 1995; Jack, 2005).  They link SME leaders to 
‘other social circles’ that provide them with important resources and information (Jack, 2005: 
1247). This implies that entrepreneurs from such countries will tend to compensate for 
institutional voids by relying on their personal relationships (strong social ties) in dense 
networks to access resources, information and necessary help (Uzzi, 1997; Miller et al., 2009; 
Kiss and Danis, 2010).  The greater incidence of institutional voids in Egypt, particularly a 
lack of transparency in formal institutional procedures, is expected to encourage SME 
decision-makers in that country to resort to informal networking as a means of securing 
institutional support and reducing business uncertainties (Miller, Lee, Chang & Le Breton-
Miller, 2009).   
 
By contrast, the securing of institutional support in developed economies does not need to 
rely so much on establishing special connections or informal practices, and indeed such 
 
 
behaviours may not be regarded as legitimate in cultures characterized by norms of 
universalism and individualism (Hofstede, 2001; Nardon & Steers, 2009; Ronen & Shenkar, 
2013). These norms emphasize adherence to general rules and place limited value on 
particularistic socially-supportive relationships (Dodd & Patra, 2002; House et al, 2004). 
SMEs from developed economies such as the UK are embedded in contexts well-endowed 
with the physical and information resources that are crucial for doing business in foreign 
markets. They generally have a relative abundance of the resources that their decision-makers 
need to undertake successful internationalization (Covin & Miller, 2013). These economies 
not only have institutional provisions for supporting SME internationalization, but formalized 
and transparent procedures are in place for accessing such provisions. Such procedures are 
consistent with their more universalistic cultural norms.  Their SME decision-makers are also 
able to sign up to, and rely on, formal means of transaction governance − especially 
contractual agreements − when dealing with external parties in their home environment 
where the legal enforcement of contracts is generally more reliable. Consequently, they are 
less likely to have to rely on informal networking with officials, either directly or through the 
agency of ‘brokers’, in order to secure the support they require for internationalization (Peng, 
2003).  Moreover, in developed economies, more information is likely to be publicly 
available or accessible through weaker external links.   These external links are usually weak 
ties characterised by a low frequency of focused interaction, and they provide an opportunity 
to access a diverse set of resources and information (Burt, 1992; 2005). They are mainly 
contractually-based with the parties meeting only to discuss business-related matters 
(Granovetter, 1973; Woolcock, 1998). 
 
There are specific contrasts in the cultural traditions of Egypt and the UK which may be 
expected to reinforce differences in the networking behaviour of SMEs in relation to relevant 
institutions. Whereas cultural scores for the UK tend towards universalism, individualism and 
low uncertainty avoidance, the cluster of Arab countries to which Egypt belongs tend toward 
high particularism, collectivism and uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede 2001, Nardon & Steers, 
2009).4  The relatively few studies of Egyptian culture emphasize sensitivity to personal 
relationships including the duty of friends to perform favours (i.e. particularism) (e.g. Ezzat, 
2003; Leila, Yassin & Palmer, 1985; Nydell, 2012, Ralston, Egri, Riddle, Butt, Dalgic & 
Brock, 2012; Youssef, 1994).  In Egypt, the term wasta refers to, ‘who I know’, through 
                                                 
4 As the study by Ralston et al. (2012) found, there is nevertheless a degree of heterogeneity within the so-called 
‘Arab cluster’. 
 
 
whom ‘I can pull some strings’ and ‘who can I consult’, within my family and friends’ social 
networks, in order to help me find my way through an issue (Smith, Huang, Harb & Torres, 
2012). The higher score for collectivism in Egypt suggests that, compared to their 
counterparts in the UK, the heads of Egyptian SMEs are more likely to engage with dense 
networks composed of strong and long-term ties. This, together with their tendency toward 
particularism, implies that they will draw heavily on friends, family, colleagues and long-
term acquaintances to gain access to information and resources and to solve problems 
encountered as a result of institutional voids. The greater valence given to particularism in 
Egyptian culture also implies an expectation that institutional rules and procedures will not be 
applied equally to everyone and that cultivating a special relationship with officials is 
necessary and normal. This is consistent with the use of Wasta in terms of finding someone in 
a high position to get things done faster and even to obtain approvals (Hutchings & Weir, 
2006). The relatively high incidence of uncertainty avoidance in Egypt implies a reluctance to 
rely on weaker impersonal ties rather than those which have a strong trust basis. By contrast, 
culture scores for the UK suggest that decision-makers there will rely less on private social 
networks to reduce uncertainties about expanding abroad, and that in their dealings with 
institutions they expect to be treated the same as everyone else on a standard and transparent 
basis (Hofstede 2001, Nardon & Steers, 2009).  
 
The salient features of the Egyptian and UK institutional and cultural contexts are therefore 
expected to reinforce each other in encouraging contrasting uses of network attachments to 
assist internationalization (Covin & Miller, 2013). This argument associates both the conduct 
of institutions and how citizens cope with institutional voids with cultural norms of 
behaviour.  The relationship between national cultures and levels of national institutional 
development has been subject to considerable debate, and it remains an open question as to 
how much, and under what circumstances, institutions shape cultures and vice versa (Child, 
2000; Alesina & Giuliano, 2013). It has been argued that economic development is associated 
with both cultural evolution and institutional development (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).  There 
is, however, general agreement that national institutions and cultures are mutually 
informative and supportive (Hitt, Franklin & Zhu, 2006).  Indeed, the two concepts are elided 
in the hard-soft institution duality in which cultural norms and orientations can be regarded as 
equivalent to respectively the normative and cognitive pillars of institutions (Scott, 2014). 
Cultures are ‘carriers’ of institutional norms and values (Scott, 2008), while institutions are 
bearers and embodiments of cultures (Leung & Ang, 2009). Culture shapes subjective 
 
 
expectations regarding habituated behaviour, and institutions embody and reproduce its 
manifest characteristics (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).  This common element is captured by 
Bourdieu’s (1990) concept of ‘habitus’: a system of durable, transposable dispositions which 
are both structured and structuring.  In other words, although cultures are ultimately 
subjective and difficult to assess social phenomena, it is reasonable to assume that when 
comparing different countries both the behaviour of institutional officials and the ways in 
which citizens interpret and respond to such behaviour will tend to reflect cultural norms. Of 
present relevance is the possibility that in the presence of institutional voids, especially weak 
rules and procedures, cultural norms provide points of reference for coping behaviour to fill 
the gaps.   
 
 
SCOPE AND METHOD  
Sample  
The main objective of this paper is to develop an empirically-informed theoretical framework 
that proposes how institutional characteristics in different national contexts lead to patterns of 
SME networking. The empirical contribution to developing the framework necessitated a 
research design that allows for an in-depth and holistic understanding of a complex social 
phenomenon  and ‘uncovering of the predominance of actors’ experiences’ (Yin, 2009; 
Bluhm, Harman, Lee and Mitchell, 2010:5). We employ a qualitative multiple case study 
design to provide a contextualised insight into ‘how’ and ‘why’ SME leaders respond to 
institutional voids through networking (Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki & Paavilainen-
Mäntymäki, 2011). To assist theory-building, we aimed to have a sufficient number of cases 
to identify recurrent patterns and the contrasting circumstances in which such patterns were 
evident (Lamb, Sandberg & Liesch, 2011).  The research setting involved well-established 
internationalising SMEs located in two contexts that contrast in their level of economic and 
institutional development. This setting offers several advantages.  It provides a strong basis 
for comparing the nature of institutional support as well as SME decision-makers’ 
networking responses to institutional voids and dysfunctionalities. Secondly, both countries 
exhibit cultural differences which may inform the networking behaviours of SMEs. 
 
The study covered 20 Egyptian and 20 UK SMEs, all companies of over ten years standing. 
Both samples were similarly distributed between manufacturing and service companies. 
 
 
Fifteen of the Egyptian SMEs were manufacturing and five were service; sixteen of the UK 
SMEs were manufacturing and four were service. They had all been operating in international 
markets for at least six years. We conducted two rounds of data collection.  The first round 
involved a visit to each firm for a personal interview with its founder and/or the manager 
responsible for its international business development (the ‘decision-maker’).  These visits 
took place in each country during the period 2009-2011 and involved 54 interviews. Since 
this was shortly before the start of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, we also in 2016 conducted a 
second round of data collection in half (10) of the Egyptian SMEs to assess whether our 
initial findings for Egypt remained valid in the post-revolution situation.5  Table 2 provides 
an overview of the cases at the time of the first round.  
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and overview of the cases  
 
 
 
Data collection 
We relied primarily on qualitative data from in-depth semi-structured interviews with SME 
decision makers and representatives from governmental supporting agencies.  In addition, 
emails and phone calls were used to ensure that the selected cases matched the sampling 
criteria and to clarify inconsistences, while reference was made to archival data such as 
company websites, business publications, newspaper clippings, annual reports, project 
biographies and databases, company’s promotional materials and the publications and reports 
of support agencies. 
                                                 
5 The other Egyptian SMEs visited before the revolution had either ceased trading or exporting. It should be 
noted, however, that it is the contrasts between Egypt and the UK prior to 2011 that provide the empirical 
basis for subsequent theory-building. 
  Age of the 
firm 
(years) 
 
Number of 
employees 
Age at first 
internationalisation 
(years) 
Percentage 
of foreign 
sales 
Number of 
overseas 
markets 
UK 
cases 
(N=20) 
Mean 38 
 
71 
 
 
9 
 
58 
 
22 
 
Standard 
deviation 
28 96 15 35 20 
Egyptian 
cases 
(N=20) 
Mean 17 
 
74 
 
5 
 
51 
 
9 
 
Standard 
deviation 
4.8 63 4.4 28 2.8 
 
 
 
The interviews were conducted by the first author who is an Arabic native speaker and who is 
also fluent in English.  Egyptian interviews were carried out in Arabic and then translated 
into English. To check the reliability of the translation, three transcripts were back-translated 
from English to Arabic by a professional bilingual translator/editor. A total of 64 semi-
structured interviews were conducted in the two countries during both rounds of data 
collection. Since in most of the SMEs, decisions on internationalization and relations with 
agencies were taken by one person, it was only appropriate to interview additional informants 
in a few firms. Each interview lasted on average between one and half to two hours, typically 
producing 20 pages of single-spaced transcript based on structured open-ended questioning. 
Sixty of the interviews were tape recorded.  
 
The interviews covered the dealings of SME decision makers with domestic institutional 
agencies relevant to their internationalization, the extent to which they encountered 
institutional voids, the networking they initiated with those institutions and other parties who 
played a crucial for their internationalisation, and its perceived benefits and costs. 
Respondents were encouraged to give reasons for decisions taken on international initiatives 
and networking, as well as their interpretation of the situation that had informed the 
decisions. Four additional interviews were also conducted with trade advisors and managers 
of governmental supporting agencies in the UK and Egypt in order to understand the type of 
support these supporting agencies offer to SMEs and the criteria through which SMEs 
become eligible for different types of support.   
 
Data preparation and analysis 
After writing up each case individually, material from the transcripts was classified with 
respect to issues involved in relations with institutions and characteristics of the SME’s 
networking. The classification was replicated independently by another researcher and there 
was 91 percent overall agreement.  Instances of disagreement were resolved through 
discussion.  As a further check, feedback on these findings was provided to three of the 
Egyptian interviewees and two of the UK ones to confirm that they matched their 
experiences, and they suggested no changes. 
 
The SMEs’ experiences with domestic institutions described in the interviews were 
classified into the categories shown in Tables 3 to 6 below.  We were particularly interested in 
 
 
the qualitative nature of the network ties that SME decision-makers in the two countries had both 
with institutional actors and with contacts relevant to their institutional relations.  Three tie 
qualities were assessed – tie strength, tie function, and whether the tie was primarily business or 
social in nature.  Ties were classified as either ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ (Granovetter, 1973). The 
strength of tie was measured within the course of the interview through the concentric 
circles approach commonly employed by sociologists (Borgatti & Everett, 2000). The aim 
was to identify varying degrees of strength for each group or type of actors.  This meant that 
after asking about the full history of SME from inception until the time of data collection, 
we grouped key ties mentioned by the interviewee into categories and asked her/him to 
locate the strongest tie to the SME on the closest circle to the centre (SME) and weakest tie 
on the farthest circle and any medium strength relationships to be located in middle circle. 
However, in some cases the interviewee identified the strength of a particular tie(s), within 
the course of our conversation. This was taken into account as a key representation of the 
strength of that particular tie. As well as the identity of network ties, the functions for the 
SME attributed to them were also assessed and this enabled us to pinpoint ties directly 
relevant to the SME’s relations with institutions. Network ties were classified as ‘social’ in 
nature if they involved personal relationships with family, friends, acquaintances and 
colleagues.  They were classified as ‘business’ ones if they were arms-length or governed 
primarily by contract.  
 
FINDINGS  
 
Institutional voids and SME networking – Egypt 
The Egyptian SMEs generally had a greater dependency on institutional agencies than did 
their UK counterparts.  Not only could the Egyptian agencies place restrictions on the SMEs, 
but the Egyptian firms tended to have fewer non-institutional network ties to rely on as 
alternative sources of information and support.6  All but one of the Egyptian decision-makers 
interviewed related one or more negative experiences of dealing with institutional agencies 
that had a charter to assist SME internationalization.  In the cases where they had received 
assistance from them, they reported that this was not easy to obtain.   
 
                                                 
6 For this difference between Egyptian and UK SMEs, p < .05 (Mann-Whitney U test). 
 
 
Their narratives portrayed the problems posed by institutional voids in Egypt.  These 
problems are categorized in Table 3 along with an illustrative quotation from the interviews.  
 
The six first-order categories of Egyptian institutional voids which emerged can be grouped 
into two second-order categories.  The first of these indicates a low level of competence on 
the part of public agencies, while the second reflects a restriction of institutional support, in 
some cases unless a bribe is offered. Dysfunctional bureaucratic procedures, ad hoc changes 
in regulations, a failure to take advantage of trade agreements, and poor institutional 
performance fall into the first category. Difficulties in obtaining relevant licenses and lack of 
staff motivation fall into the second category.  
 
The Egyptian decision-makers interviewed in 2016 reported that they faced similar negative 
experiences as they did before the revolution.  The SMEs that survived the upheaval had 
either to halt activities for almost three years or keep their operations to the minimum.  All 
the SME decision makers reported that, following the 2013 military intervention, they dealt 
with the same supporting agencies which were still managed in a similar way to before.   The 
following statement by the founder of an engineering consultancy firm is representative of 
their view:  
‘The key problem is that the country suffers from the same institutional problems as it 
did before the revolution, given that it is the same old governmental institutions and 
same mentality of the old regime that still moves and controls the economy…The 
revolution only opened a can of worms and exposed corruption, bribes and misuse of 
public funds into the open’.   
 
Table 3. Egypt: Problems posed by institutional voids 
 
 
Category of problem 
 
Example 
 
Dysfunctional 
bureaucratic procedures 
‘In Egypt there are numerous obstacles [in the way of SME exporting] such as 
official documents and letters of credit that are submitted to official authorities 
concerned with exporting such as banks. The general exporting association asks 
for loads of papers and supporting documents that take time and are too 
complicated, and at the same time do not guarantee you will get your money’. 
 
‘None of these units or agencies actually offers real support to SMEs. They talk 
and say what is supposed to be said but in effect they are offering hardly anything 
to support and promote SMEs domestically and internationally.  The institutional 
system we have sets rules and procedures to help SMEs but these are highly 
ineffective and useless… we have the 2004 law governing the situation of SMEs 
 
 
in Egypt and the support for start-ups and export promotion….. it’s nice but it’s 
not put into practice. Therefore I am saying its useless’. 
Ad hoc changes in 
regulations  
‘One day we woke up and found from a newspaper that our export minister had 
restricted the export of recycled plastics. If you do so, you pay a fine of $1000 per 
ton and our profit was only $200 per ton…We had a contract and we had to fulfil 
our commitment. We tried to talk to the officials but no use and as you know this 
is Egypt, and you wake up every day there is always a change. It is a very 
uncertain business environment, you cannot predict for five years ahead, not even 
for one year, as tomorrow something dramatic could happen’. 
 
 
Failure to take advantage 
of bilateral trade 
agreements 
‘Egypt has several trade agreements like COMESA [Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa], the Arab League and the Quiz Agreement between Egypt, 
USA and Israel but we never use them…either because the government employees 
obtain no immediate gain from it or they are simply unaware of them’. 
Poor institutional 
performance and limited 
monitoring of supporting 
agencies  
‘The SFD lacks the necessary market knowledge about, for example, quality 
standards that are required by European or North American markets needed.  Its 
departments report to some people in senior positions who set targets for them 
that, let’s say, they need to help 5 or 6 SMEs to participate in a trade show.  All 
they care about is these numbers and not necessarily the quality of service they 
offer or whether people benefit from them or not’. 
‘We work in a random and non-structured market… there is no monitoring or 
supervision of supporting agencies who work closely with the key wood importers 
or exporters…we depend in our hand-made products on imported wood because 
the local alternative is of poor quality…. We pay the black market price which is 
very high…. And we have to abide to the rules of the larger manufacturer(s) who 
we cannot export except through him … it’s a case of monopoly …believe me 
when I say it’s under the eyes of supporting agencies…. They sponsor if you like 
those large manufacturers to trade fairs and they get part of the profits these 
manufacturers get. We are exploited by a  set of capitalists [large store owners] 
and no one stops them or even hold them accountable’  
 
Difficulty of obtaining 
relevant licences 
‘It took me believe it or not nearly ten years to get registered..[..]….I had to go 
through the whole process and it did not work, sorry to say, but under the table 
was one way to get my papers approved I would not call it bribe I would call it a 
gift to get through to the concerned employee to have a look at the documents I 
submitted...In order to finish it you have to pay a lot of gifts, you find open 
drawers, payments under the table’. 
Lack of agency staff 
motivation 
The founder of a company producing medical equipment reported that: ‘The SFD 
sponsored me and others to an all-inclusive Egyptian products trade fair in Italy.  
We were given a very limited space to set up our booth and beside me was a guy 
who presented clothing and food, and next to him was someone who produces 
carpets. When I complained about this to the commercial attaché appointed by 
SFD to organize the fair, his response was 'you should thank God that you got the 
chance to come to Italy’. 
 
 
 
All the Egyptian respondents mentioning these institutional voids stated that personal 
contacts were necessary in order to address them.  In the first place, such contacts were 
required to obtain information about the services that institutional agencies could potentially 
offer SMEs. This information was not readily available through formal public channels. As 
one founder decision-maker said: ‘the biggest advantage of good relationships in Egypt is 
that they introduce you and direct you to where you can get needed information’.  The leader 
 
 
of a software firm said that ‘it was through my parents’ close links with people in the 
Ministry of Exports who told them about the incubator facility offered by the SFD’.  
Generally speaking, information about institutional services helpful to SME development and 
exporting was obtained through personal contacts rather than through publicly accessible 
media channels. 
 
Personal contacts were also often necessary to activate support from institutions or to 
overcome bureaucratic obstacles they imposed.  The head of a firm producing marble, who 
was refused help by the IMC to attend a major annual trade fair, commented that ‘unless you 
know someone in the IMC and/or are one of the big players who control the economy, you 
will not get such support’. The founder of the manufacturing company who was the source of 
the second quotation in Table 3 only sorted out his problem through finding a contact who 
opened the way for a meeting with the export minister: 
‘We finally found a contact that exceptionally opened a way for us to meet the 
minister. You cannot meet the minister on your own…you know how things are in 
Egypt. So through this contact we met the minister and it was sorted.  It took about six 
months to get it sorted, but eventually we got the problem sorted out.  Unfortunately 
because of this problem I incurred a lot of losses which made me close this line of 
business and stick to software as a much safer option’. 
 
Knowing the right person in relevant institutions, or having a personal connection who could 
effect that link, was a theme mentioned by three-quarters of the Egyptian interviewees.  Even 
when access to institutional approval or support was gained through personal networking, 
gifts and under-the-table payments would often be required to get action taken. While they 
complained about the system, they accepted that this was ‘the way things are done in Egypt’ 
and that this was, in effect, an embedded characteristic of the national culture. The heavy 
reliance on personal links also limited the number and type of foreign markets which the 
Egyptian SME decision-makers felt able to enter – primarily those in the MENA region. 
These were markets with which network partners had their own personal links and 
knowledge, and which, given the uncertainty of institutional support, they felt it more 
comfortable to enter.  
 
Some Egyptian respondents commented that in the absence of formalized rights of access, 
smaller firms were at a disadvantage in securing the attention of institutional official 
 
 
compared to large and leading firms. A senior official in the SFD admitted that due to lack of 
resources, the agency had to prioritise larger firms that were seen to contribute 
proportionately more to the Egyptian economy. Five SMEs, whose decision makers were 
initially unable to access institutional support on their own, created their own informal 
industry groups to exercise direct pressure to gain personal access to the export minister. 
Through collective action they were able to offset their liability of smallness and leverage a 
degree of power vis-á-vis the institution. After the revolution, another SME decision-maker 
described how he and other SME leaders decided to put up a representative in the parliament 
or in one of the political parties supporting the current regime to voice their concerns. They 
thought that working with key decision makers rather than against them would be more 
fruitful.  
 
It was evident that SME decision makers rely on a range of network attachments to cope with 
institutional dysfunctions inherent in the Egyptian context. In many cases they sought to 
access institutions through informal channels; in some other cases they organized among 
themselves to open up such channels, and in other cases channels to the institutions were 
established because the SMEs’ established reputation as exporters lead government agencies 
to seek them out as role models. Their description of the network attachments they relied 
upon fall into the four categories summarized in Table 4.  Some interviewees gave related 
examples that fell into more than one category. 
 
The first category involved a referral from a close friend, family member or a colleague 
located outside an institutional agency, where this served as a means to gain access to 
information about available institutional support and accessing overseas networks.  The 
relationships activated here are strong and primarily social ties to dense networks. The second 
category was concerned with having or finding a connection with a key decision maker 
within an institutional agency. In both categories, the connection with a key gatekeeper, 
decision maker or strategic player served as a platform for SMEs to gain access to support. 
The ties with the intermediaries were strong social ones, though the secondary ties to the 
institutional agencies were weak and of limited duration. The third category involved the 
creation of an informal industry group to gain attention and obtain support from the 
institutional agency. The ties among members of the industry group were strong ones of a 
primarily business nature that took a long time to develop, although they were less formally  
 
 
 
Table 4.  Egypt: Use of network ties in response to institutional voids 
Use of network 
ties to cope with 
institutional voids  
 
Examples of voids 
being filled 
Type of tie and 
strength 
Illustrative quotation Cost/negative consequences 
associated with the use of network 
attachment to cope with voids  
Performance outcomes  
A referral from a 
close friend, 
family member or 
a colleague 
outside the 
institutional 
agencies. 
 
 
To get information 
about sources of 
support not 
elsewhere readily 
available or to use 
these network ties to 
facilitate access to 
overseas markets. 
 
These were 
predominately 
personal 
relationships 
(more than 60% 
of total ties). They 
were strong ties to 
highly dense 
networks. The 
SME decision 
maker trusted 
these ties and 
relied on them 
extensively on to 
enter overseas 
markets or to 
learn about 
available sources 
of support and 
finance [in terms 
of who and where 
to ask]. 
 
‘We got to know about it [SFD] 
through an outing with friends and 
business people who mentioned that 
they heard about something called 
SFD, even if these people didn’t 
know much about it. They provided 
us with a hint and then we chased 
up the information and started to 
ask ourselves who we know that 
might know anything about this. 
Then I told Mr A one of my distant 
relatives who works in one of well-
known governmental agencies. So I 
asked him what do you know about 
SFD what so they offer, where can I 
find it ...etc. this person gave me 
the beginning of the thread which 
was the most important thing for 
us.’ 
 
In order to access support and 
advice when needed, SME decision 
makers had to continuously nourish 
the relationships with their key ties, 
even when there was no immediate 
requirement of them. In 7 cases, 
decision-makers bought gifts and 
exchanged favours in order not to 
lose the relationship.  
 
For example: 
‘We had to keep in touch with those 
key relationships. We would call 
them regularly send gifts and cards 
on special occasions such as 
weddings and new births, and 
sometimes organise dinners in 
Ramadan and invite all sorts of 
people even those we haven’t asked 
for a favour for years, so as to keep 
the relationship going in case we 
need to ask them for a favour or 
advice in the future… I am afraid 
this is the only way to survive’. 
These SMEs operated in only 
a limited number of overseas 
markets, principally where 
they had a family or a friend 
connected with a market. 
 
 ‘Our initial export attempt 
was to Holland and Germany 
through my relative who 
owns a warehouse and 
through him I managed to 
furnish houses for some of 
his friends in 
Germany…[..]…. It’s the 
same when we exported to 
Italy or the US – usually a 
family or a relative… I 
would not export to overseas 
markets except through 
people I trust to help me 
enter these markets… I have 
only few of these cases’. 
 
 
Having or finding 
a connection with 
a key decision 
maker in the 
institutional 
agencies.  
 
 
This is the so-called 
‘Wasta’, Decision 
makers rely on their 
close friends/family 
to connect them with 
strategic 
intermediaries [such 
as key government 
officials and 
SME leaders, 
mainly founders, 
relied on strong 
personal 
relationships to 
get in touch with 
intermediaries. 
The 
intermediaries 
‘To get support from IMC I had to 
be recommended to them through 
one of those people at the top … I 
asked my cousin-who is well 
connected- to find me an 
appropriate contact and to ask him 
to recommend me to the decision 
committee to get some support. It is 
very difficult to survive in Egypt let 
Maintaining a relationship with key 
intermediaries, especially those 
from whom favours are sought, is 
costly and time consuming  
 
According to the founder of a  
company that relied extensively on 
ties to intermediaries: 
‘In case of relationships you devote 
These SMEs were mainly 
slow internationalizers, who 
operated in a limited number 
of markets, as it took them 
several years to establish 
their company’s domestically 
and to access needed 
resources to export.  
  
 
 
facilitators] to 
overcome 
bureaucracy, access 
support and obtain 
needed licences.   
then affect a 
contact with a key 
institutional 
official. 
Relationships 
between the SME 
leader and 
government 
official are one-
off or of limited 
duration. 
alone to succeed and grow 
overseas’.  
 
 
all the sources of power and 
strength to build them. But not once 
– you have to do this on A 
continuous basis and these sources 
of strength have to be built 
continuously, otherwise they 
collapse’. 
Creation of 
informal industry 
group to gain 
attention and get 
support. Or 
having a 
representative in 
political circles  
to voice their 
concerns 
 
 
 These were groups 
of competitors and 
suppliers who came 
together usually as a 
result of one initiator   
to pressure the 
government to 
change certain laws 
or to access a 
particular type of 
support (such has 
access to foreign aid 
money allocated only 
to certain industries)  
These were strong 
business 
relationships that 
took a long time 
to develop.  They 
were enduring but 
often dormant, 
being activated 
only when 
needed. 
‘I grouped several of the furniture 
manufacturers here in this industrial 
zone and I was elected to be the 
director to speak to the export 
minister to ask him to make it 
easier for us to import wood and he 
listened only because we were a 
group of companies not simply one 
or two’.  
 
‘I am planning to become a member 
of the parliament in the next round 
to represent paper manufacturers. I 
want to have a voice and someone 
who can defend the rights of small 
firms. If you cannot play against 
them, play with them’. 
 
To create such informal industry 
groups takes time and energy. 
Especially if the initiator has to 
convince his competitors to 
collaborate with each other and that 
this is for a collective benefit rather 
than an individual one.  
 
 
These SMEs where the most 
successful category of 
companies in our sample. 
They operated in a relatively 
large number of overseas 
markets.  
Securing 
institutional 
assistance for 
exporting on the 
basis of evident 
success in the 
domestic market. 
 
 
The decision 
maker(s) relied on 
friends/family  and 
former colleagues to 
grow in  the domestic 
market  [such as key 
contacts in state 
owned department 
stores, hotel chains 
and holding 
companies]. After 
These were 
predominately 
strong personal 
relationships.  
‘Back then, the SFD did not offer 
me any support, though the bank 
gave me a loan because I registered 
with the SFD.  Later when our 
brand became well known, I found 
them contacting me and suggesting 
there is this trade fair and we want 
you to participate at short notice. I 
was surprised and said ‘how 
come?’...It’s again a matter of 
knowing people ‘. 
This is a lengthy process, with no 
guarantee of a positive response 
from institutional agencies. 
 
The time it took to gain an 
established domestic reputation in 
order to gain support or permission 
to export delayed the firms’ 
internationalization. 
These SMEs were offered 
substantial support and 
resource at a later stage of 
their development that 
allowed them to expand 
internationally.  
 
  
 
 
which institutional 
agencies approached 
these SMEs and 
offered them support. 
  
 
 
organized than the ‘business groups’ which in India have been an effective means for 
securing growth opportunities under conditions of institutional voids (Manikandan & 
Ramachandran, 2015). Subsequently, some additional furniture SMEs formed a cooperative 
partly with the intention of securing greater attention from support agencies. The fourth 
category was different to the others in that it did not involve a proactive initiative by the 
SME.  Institutional access arose from the firm becoming an established player in the 
domestic market with a good track record of successful exporting.  Here reputation and 
legitimacy led to an approach from the institution, which as a result offered support.  
 
Limited institutional voids and SME networking – the UK 
The overwhelmingly critical narrative that was typical of the Egyptian decision-makers’ 
views on institutions was absent from the accounts of the UK interviewees.  Almost half of 
them mentioned no problems at all in dealing with institutional agencies. While the problems 
listed in Table 5 did arise, they experienced few institutional voids relating to export support. 
The majority of the firms (14 out of 20) had used official export promotion services and with 
two exceptions found them helpful.  Some were highly favourable in their comments, such as 
the founder of a manufacturing SME who said that ‘the UKTI and the local chamber [of 
commerce] were key domestic relationships that helped me a lot...they were key to our 
survival’.  Support activities such as advice on how to export, partial funding to participate in 
trade missions, and linking with UK overseas commercial staff who provided introductions to 
potential customers were valued, especially in the early stages of targeting new foreign 
markets.   
 
Table 5.  UK: Problems posed by institutional voids 
 
Category of problem Example 
Inability to provide 
sufficiently customised 
niche information  
‘Regarding UKTI and other governmental supporting agencies, I find working with 
them is not very useful because of the nature of our market and it is a very niche 
one. If we were in agriculture or the medical field where it is a clear cut area or 
segment of industry, these companies will benefit and find the information they 
need from these agencies. However, the tobacco industry is a very niche one’. 
 
Insufficient attention to 
some emerging markets  
‘They [UKTI and overseas embassies] were not very helpful in some parts of the 
world’.  
 
Lack of knowledge of 
institutional  staff and/or 
their knowledge is inferior 
‘We didn’t use them…. Because I think at that time we felt that we were self-
sufficient and we had the ability to handle it ourselves...we did not need their 
services; they would not add much to us that we already don’t have’. 
 
 
to that of the SME 
entrepreneur 
 
Internal institutional 
inefficiencies  
‘UKTI don’t seem to be one UKTI they seem to be about 300 and I know that’s an 
exaggeration and but it is a problem...I used to get a phone call from somebody 
saying they are from UKTI and they are different…they seem to be tripping over 
each other and not everyone knows what others do’. 
 
 
The institutional voids reported by the UK firms all related to problems of agency 
competence. There were no instances where access to the institutions was stated to be 
problematic or conditional on social contacts. Nor was there any claim that the domestic 
institutional system in the UK could obstruct internationalization. When criticisms were made 
of institutional support, they normally referred to two sets of issues.  As Table 5 illustrates, 
the first set comprised three first-order categories: an inability to provide sufficiently 
customized niche information (including criticism of tick-box formalization); insufficient 
attention to some developing economy markets; and institutional staff having less knowledge 
than the SME decision-maker.  The second set of problems was mentioned in only three cases 
and these concerned internal inefficiencies such as a lack of coordination within the primary 
institutional agency. 
 
In the main, the UK companies had developed a range of non-governmental network 
contacts, such as with customers, chambers of commerce and professional advisors, which 
they utilized to support their international expansion over a wide range of foreign markets. As 
Table 6 indicates, they often relied on their own ability to generate network attachments 
where necessary to compensate for a limitation in institutional knowledge about markets or 
contacts. In three cases, they had secured helpful advice from professional export promoters 
in chambers of commerce who provided information on, and introductions to, the various 
schemes funded by UKTI.  Most of the SMEs were members of their local chambers of 
commerce. In contrast to the case of Egypt, these contacts were primarily of a ‘business’ 
(non-social) fee-paying nature and the firms’ relations with them had a contractual basis. 
They normally developed such contacts through their own initiative rather than relying on 
referral through social ties. Moreover, coming from a stronger institutional context, they 
could rely more on legally-enforceable contracts and other institutional supports to hedge 
against internationalization risks. The schemes on offer are formalized, transparent and 
relatively accessible. Compared to their Egyptian counterparts, UK SMEs have more 
opportunity to access diverse sources of information and resources, and consequently their 
internationalization is less constrained.
 
 
Table 6.  UK: Use of network ties in response to institutional voids 
Use of network 
ties to cope with 
institutional voids  
 
Examples of 
voids being filled 
Type of tie and strength Illustrative quotation Cost/negative consequences 
associated with the use of 
network attachment to cope 
with voids  
Performance 
outcomes  
Relying on their 
ability to create 
their own 
network 
attachments to 
compensate for  
an institutional 
void 
 
Lack of 
knowledge of 
institutional  staff 
and/or their 
knowledge is 
inferior to that of 
the SME 
entrepreneur  
 
 
Insufficient 
attention by 
agencies to some 
emerging markets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inability to 
provide 
sufficiently 
customised niche 
information 
 
 
These were predominately 
business/contractual 
relationships, and mainly 
involved weak ties. The UK 
SMEs had large sparse 
networks.  
 
 
 
 
‘My business is straight 
forward and I refer to rely on 
private agencies in African 
markets because they know 
the rules of the game or my 
own personal contacts in this 
market….the UKTI will not 
provide me with market 
information that I cannot 
obtain myself’. 
 
‘We find that the 
information that we gather 
ourselves either through the 
internet or through people 
we know is better; it’s more 
on the ground information’.  
 
‘The UKTI has been very helpful for us 
in India…so in the case of India and 
some emerging economies they are very 
good...but in other places they are not 
helpful so we depended on our contacts 
and intermediaries that we had in these 
markets or sometimes even established 
new relationships through the alliance I 
told you about’.  
 
‘Because we had our contacts and 
knowledge we did not need their 
[UKTI’s] help other than for funding a 
costly journey such as going to Brazil’. 
 
 
This has been mostly a 
successful strategy. However, 
five SME decision makers 
reported instances where these 
weak business ties became 
problematic and led to 
withdrawal from overseas 
markets. For example: 
 
 
‘We have always relied on 
agents/distributors to sell our 
products in almost every market 
we operate in. However, this 
strategy was not successful in 
Middle East. For example, we 
found out through one of our 
former clients that our agent in 
Tunisia was selling our products 
with his name on it and making 
a higher profit margin than what 
he told us …[..].. We could not 
take him to court … it takes 
ages and I am not sure it would 
be successful….. We ended up 
withdrawing from this market’. 
These SMEs 
operated in a large 
number of 
overseas markets 
and in diverse 
regions.  
 
 
 
 
Help from other 
professional 
contacts to learn 
about institutional 
support  
 
 
Limited public 
information about 
institutional 
support schemes. 
SME decision-makers relied 
on their own local 
connections to gain 
information or support.  
 
.  
‘We hadn’t got any idea about how to 
export…My accountant said I can put 
you in touch with an organization called 
the UK trade forum located in 
Birmingham…I became a member and 
though that became  aware that UKTI 
had money available to support 
businesses like mine’. 
Relying on existing local 
networks sometimes shielded 
the decision-maker from 
opportunities to expand into 
other markets or to build 
relationships in those markets 
where they did not have a 
contact 
 
 
These SMEs 
operated in a 
limited number of 
overseas markets.  
 
 
 
 
Reference to the experiences related by interviewees therefore indicate that, the contrasts in 
the networking initiatives of Egyptian and UK SMEs in support of their internationalization 
do reflect an adjustment to differences in institutional voids.  While it is difficult to 
disentangle the functional rationales informing their networking from behaviour that is 
culturally-informed, the contrasts that emerged are consistent with differences that scholars 
have discerned between Egyptian and UK (British) cultures.   
 
DISCUSSION  
The aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical model of networking by internationalizing 
SMEs in the light of domestic institutional conditions and cultures. Findings from a 
qualitative comparison of Egypt and the UK indicate that both level of economic 
development and cultural behavioural norms need to be incorporated into such a model. 
While virtually all the SMEs stood to benefit from support from institutional agencies, those 
in Egypt tended to be more dependent on such agencies. Moreover, the conditions for 
obtaining that support were substantially different due to the greater incidence of institutional 
voids in Egypt. The technical competence of export promoting agencies in Egypt was 
generally less developed than those in the UK and, significantly, access to their assistance 
was less governed by clear universalistic rules.  In Egypt, the presence of institutional voids 
was evidenced by a disjuncture between the formal definition of institutions and their actual 
performance in respect of providing support to SMEs. In the absence of universalistic rules, 
or adherence to them, SMEs decision-makers in Egypt typically resorted to informal social 
connections in order to achieve access to institutional officers and their assistance.   
 
The nature of the social mediation toward institutions through networking reported by 
Egyptian respondents not only reflects institutional conditions but is also consistent with that 
country’s cultural norms [‘the way things are done here’], especially concerning 
particularism, collectivism and uncertainty avoidance. The reliance on strong personalized 
networks characteristic of Egypt was almost entirely absent from the UK sample. It is likely 
to be employed far less in countries like the UK where cultures and institutions emphasize 
universalism, and where individualistic social actors with low uncertainty avoidance are more 
willing to rely on weak business-like network ties. Overall, the conclusions to be drawn from 
our study elaborate the observation made by Puffer, McCarthy, Jaeger & Dunlap (2013, 
p.329) that social ties in developing economies are ‘an informal cultural-cognitive institution 
 
 
that fills the voids created by the weak legitimacy of a country’s formal regulative and 
normative institutions’. We have elaborated on the nature of these ties with reference to their 
strength, function and nature. 
 
Figure 1 brings together insights from both literature and our exploratory study in a 
theoretical model. In the model, institutions are assumed to have specific formal purposes and 
rules. Their practical application is moderated by the national context, particularly its level of 
economic development and the character of its national culture.  Level of economic 
development has consequences for institutional competences, while culture conveys norms 
about the role behaviour of institutional officials. Institutional voids results from a gap 
between formal specifications and their application in practice. These voids in the form of 
competence limitations and behavioural dysfunctions have consequences for SMEs to the 
extent that they depend on institutional resources and other support. These two forms of void 
in turn trigger SME adaptive behaviour. If the voids primarily take the form of limited 
technical capability and (as in the UK) SMEs do not depend heavily on institutional support, 
they are likely to pursue other means to facilitate their internationalization and need not take 
extra measures to secure institutional attention. If, on the other hand, there are significant 
institutional voids in the form of limited accessibility and transparency, then SMEs requiring 
institutional support will need to find networking channels to secure institutional attention.  
The greater the dependence of SMEs on institutions, the more negatively asymmetrical is 
their power vis-à-vis those institutions and the more effort they need to expend to cope with 
institutional voids. This coping behaviour is itself seen to be informed by national cultural 
norms concerning networking relationships such as appropriate and necessary ways of 
securing of services from others (such as the role of favours).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  A model of networking by internationalizing SMEs in the light of domestic institutional voids and cultures 
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Figure 1 postulates that in order to understand the responses of small internationalizing firms 
to domestic institutional voids, an analysis is required that (1) combines institutional and 
cultural referents, and (2) crosses macro (culture, level of development), meso (institution) 
and micro (firm) levels of analysis. This implies that studies into the factors which account 
for variations in networking by internationalizing SMEs should extend beyond present 
emphases on the individual and firm levels in terms of factors such as entrepreneurial 
experience and firm sector (Child & Hsieh, 2014), and take into account as well the socio-
economic environment in which the SME is embedded (Lu, Liu, Wright & Filatotchev, 
2014). 
  
Our findings suggest that in contexts like Egypt where significant institutional voids are 
manifest in problems of access, SMEs in effect face a challenge of securing institutional 
attention. We found indications that the consequences of an absence of transparent rule-based 
rights to institutional support could be moderated by the power that firms possess.  Thus it 
was agreed by respondents both from Egyptian agencies and SMEs that institutions like the 
IMC gave priority to large firms which are not only of greater significance for the economy 
but also may have opportunities to overcome difficulties of access proactively through 
lobbying and offering social investments.7 Although these opportunities are not normally 
open to SME decision-makers who lack the necessary resources and social status, there were 
instances where they were able to mobilize a degree of power and secure institutional 
attention by acting collectively. Nevertheless, in general, the notion that SMEs experience a 
liability of smallness needs to include the limited power they enjoy to solicit institutional 
attention (compared to large firms) when such attention is not mandated by a universalistic 
rule-based system. The ways that they try to cope with such institutional voids is consistent 
with the proposition that organizations with little power have to rely on social mediation to 
cope with external challenges (Child & Rodrigues, 2011). 
 
CONCLUSION 
The comparison of Egypt and the UK suggests that institutional agencies can assist SMEs to 
forge network ties of a business kind which lower transaction costs and reduce the perceived 
risk of internationalization. In this way they help SMEs to venture into unfamiliar foreign 
markets. However, it was apparent that the quality of institutional support for SME 
                                                 
7 The favouring of larger firms in Egypt has also been attributed to crony capitalism (The Economist, 2014). 
 
 
internationalization does not just depend on the competence and resources of the agencies 
concerned but also on the ease and transparency of access to their services.  For SME 
decision-makers, our findings imply that while business ties offer advantages of lower cost 
and greater scope, social ties can offer specific benefits and may be in tune with cultural 
norms. The priority given to each of these two types of tie should reflect both domestic social 
conditions and those in foreign markets. This requires a careful analysis of prevailing 
institutions and cultures.  
 
The limitations of the study serve to indicate fruitful lines of further research. One limitation 
lies in its purpose and design.  This was exploratory and small scale. The sample included 
firms across different industries in order to achieve a balance between manufacturing and 
service firms. This means that it could not examine another concomitant of the level of 
economic development, additional to institutional voids, which might influence national 
contrasts in the networking of SMEs.  This is the tendency for more developed economies to 
have a higher incidence of non-traditional knowledge-based SMEs. Such SMEs, in industries 
such as biotech and IT, typically have their own international networks in place at an early 
stage in their development (Salavisa, Sousa & Fontes, 2012). These reduce the firms’ 
dependence on institutions for supporting internationalization and thus enable some hazards 
of resource dependence to be reduced. Nor did the present study examine systematically the 
extent to which the SMEs used other network links to reduce their dependence on domestic 
institutions. In principle, SMEs have two options for dealing with domestic institutional 
voids. Either they can try to cope with them directly, which has been the focus of our study, 
or they can try to initiate or employ other network links which enable them to bypass a 
dependence on institutions.  Some of the UK firms took the second option. However, in 
Egypt this option was restricted by the preference to rely on a limited number of strong social 
ties as well as by institutional constraints such as when export permits were refused. 
  
Another limitation is that we have focused on the positive enabling aspects of networks for 
SMEs. At the same time, we noted the cost and effort required to build social network ties of 
the kind that the Egyptian SMEs heavily relied upon.  Building and maintaining such close 
network ties imposes a penalty of time and effort that may detract from pursuing 
internationalization speedily. Further research into the ‘darker’ side of networks is required, 
including the possibility that a heavy reliance on strong social networks can constrain the 
scope of SME internationalization (Sasi & Arenius, 2008).   
 
 
In conclusion, our analysis of networking by internationalizing SMEs in the light of 
contrasting levels of domestic institutional voids provides a strong pointer to the significance 
of inherent differences between developing and developed economies.  It also supports the 
view that the greater vulnerability of SMEs vis-à-vis institutions, and an explanation of their 
options for coping with this vulnerability, requires a different line of theorizing to that 
informed by the hitherto dominant focus on MNCs.  In particular, the contrasting power of 
MNEs and SMEs is a factor deserving greater attention in the future.    
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